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WHEN IS ENRICHMENT UNJUST?
RESTITUTION VISITS AN ONYX BATHROOM
Doug Rendleman*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines whether a court ought to grant a plaintiff
restitution when the events fall in the penumbra between principles
and rules and the plaintiff cannot locate the defendant's enrichment
in one of the established restitution categories. The subject, which
has attracted the thoughtful analysis of leading scholars, is a major
contested issue in contemporary restitution scholarship.' Having
* Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Thanks to Professor Emily Sherwin, Professor Rich Seamon, Professor Peter
Linzer, Dean David Partlett, and Mr. Joe Carpenter for careful readings and
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts and to the Frances Lewis Law Center for
summer research support.
Thanks finally to the Kentucky court for inspiring the title. "Onyx" has
resonated in restitution since that court explored the renowned "Great Onyx
Cave" in Edwards v. Lee's Adm 'r, 256 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936).
1. See generally Jeff Berryman, Mr. Garland Goes to Ottawa: Comments
on Restitution in Canada Through the Lens of Garland v. Consumers' Gas, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 779, 801-02 (2003) (concluding that a third approach is
superior to a "traditional category" approach or a "principled" approach
because the court following the third approach will proceed on "general
principles" while reconciling the principles with the categories of recovery);
Daniel Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of Self-Interest, and the
Limits of Free Riding, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 831 (2003) (examining problems
created by a "broad concept of unjust enrichment" and examining a palliative
principle which rejects restitution of benefits the plaintiff conferred in his self-
interest); Andrew Kull, The Source of Liability in Indemnity and Contribution,
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927 (2003) (searching unsuccessfully for a principled
breach of duty as a basis for contribution-indemnity in decisions mostly from
New York and concluding that undefined "fairness" is an unsound foundation
for recovery); Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and
Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 695 (2001) (maintaining that
since courts need a doctrinal safety valve based on a general standard of
"fairness" to escape harsh and narrow substantive rules and to avoid unfairness
in a particular dispute, they can base such a decision on unjust
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published two recent "from-the-bottom-up" articles about particular
problem areas in restitution,2 I thought it propitious to write a short
"from-the-top-down" piece about restitution analysis to contribute to
the debate and to this important Symposium. After all, real life will
continue to catapult "unprecedented" disputes into courts.
This Article begins by identifying the unjustness issue in
freestanding restitution as the doctrinal problem for analysis. Next, it
outlines two possible ways for a decisionmaker to approach
unjustness, calling them "broad restitution" and "narrow restitution."
It then emphasizes two analytical techniques to ameliorate narrow
restitution's asperity and to deepen broad restitution's analysis. The
first analytical technique this Article commends to a court is a
common law and legal realist approach. The second suggestion is
that the court consider the way a decision to grant restitution will
affect a related body of substantive law. Finally, this Article closes
by employing the suggested techniques with three examples of
increasing difficulty.
Cal Contrak's difficulty in collecting for remodeling two onyx
bathrooms is the final example. 3 Contrak was hired by Bertha Beyer
to remodel two bathrooms in Chateau Haut LaRue, an antebellum
plantation house Beyer was purchasing for $860,000 from Tom Zale.
After Contrak finished by installing the onyx tile, which gives this
article its title, Beyer paid him with a $41,000 check. Beyer's check
was dishonored. Beyer also breached her contract with Zale. She
then filed for bankruptcy and discharged her debt to Contrak.
enrichment-restitution); Eoin O'Dell, The Principle Against Unjust
Enrichment, 15 DUBLIN U. L.J. 27, 36-38 (1993) (maintaining that "unjust"
standing alone is not a principle but a category to organize the various specific
grounds for restitution); Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of
the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001) (rejecting the
argument that a court should base restitution on "equity" without further
definition in favor of a more detailed approach with unjust enrichment as an
organizational and descriptive principle instead of a legal rule).
2. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999)
[hereinafter Rendleman, Common Law Restitution]; Doug Rendleman,
Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped Off Dawson's
Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2001) [hereinafter Rendleman, Quantum Meruit
for the Subcontractor].
3. This bathroom example is derivative of facts in Orleans Onyx, Inc. v.
Buchanan, 472 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
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Finally, after having pleaded guilty to an unrelated fraud charge,
Beyer became an involuntary guest of the federal government. With
Beyer out of the picture, the inquiry below turns to whether Contrak
may recover restitution from Zale on the ground that the onyx
bathrooms unjustly enriched him.
Since Contrak's claim lies on one of restitution's fault lines, this
article will begin by filling in the background, referring to the onyx
bathrooms from time to time before paying them a call in the end.
II. RESTITUTION AFTER BREACH AND FREESTANDING RESTITUTION
Restitution is divided into two branches. First is restitution for
breach, which occurs after the defendant breaches a non-restitution
substantive standard by, for example, committing a tort or breaching
a contract. Here the plaintiff may choose restitution as an alternative
to compensatory damages. Second is freestanding restitution, which
the court bases on the defendant's unjust enrichment without finding
any other violation of substantive law. Since there is no other
substantive breach, a freestanding-restitution plaintiff recovers
restitution or nothing. Contrak's restitution claim against Zale is
freestanding since Contrak's contract was with Beyer, and Zale
neither committed a tort nor breached any other non-restitution
substantive duty to Contrak.
Decisionmakers find freestanding restitution more difficult than
restitution following the defendant's breach. When the plaintiff
seeks restitution as an alternative remedy for breach, for example,
when the defendant has committed a tort or breached a contract, the
court can identify a "wrong" and the incorrectness of the defendant's
enrichment is straightforward and readily labeled "unjust." When,
however, the defendant benefits at the plaintiff's expense but has not
breached a non-restitution substantive standard to trigger legal
liability for damages, the court must pursue a more nettlesome
inquiry into whether the defendant's enrichment is unjust.
What are the grounds for freestanding restitution? One example
is mistake, a large subject that includes many subtopics. Other
grounds for freestanding restitution are doctrines that undermine or
negate a person's consent to a transfer like duress, undue influence,
and lack of capacity. Freestanding restitution also includes recovery
of benefits that the plaintiff transferred under an agreement, which
fails as an enforceable contract, for example, for lack of a writing
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required by the statute of frauds. Perhaps the most difficult category
of freestanding restitution is a claim like Contrak's to recover
benefits the plaintiff willingly, and without a mistake, conferred on
the defendant absent a contract or gift.
III. BROAD RESTITUTION AND NARROW RESTITUTION
Whether a restitution plaintiff may recover freestanding
restitution will often depend on which of two competing approaches
to unjustness the court chooses.
This Article will refer to the two competing approaches to
unjustness in freestanding restitution as "broad restitution" and
"narrow restitution." 4 The issue which divides the approaches is
whether the defendant's "unjust enrichment" standing alone is a
sufficiently stable principle or rule to serve as a doctrinal foundation
for a court's restitution decision. Does restitution have a catch-all
category that allows a plaintiff who cannot show one of the
recognized categories of freestanding restitution to convince the
court that the defendant received an unjust benefit?
A. Broad Restitution
5
Lord Mansfield's well-known statement in 1761 in Moses v.
Macferlan6 begins a summary of broad restitution. Lord Mansfield
explained unjust enrichment in assumpsit with the sweeping
pronouncement that "natural justice" and "equity" obligated the
defendant to return the plaintiffs money. 7 "In one word, the gist of
this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of
the case, is obligated by the ties of natural justice and equity to
refund the money." 8  This statement is the first pillar of broad
restitution.
9
4. Rendleman, Common Law Restitution, supra note 2, at 888-92.
5. The following text divides several sources into competing "camps."
Professor Emily Sherwin's organization influenced my treatment which,
however, is not identical to hers, particularly in its analysis of Professor
Dawson's views. See Sherwin, supra note 1, at 2086 n.9.
6. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
7. Id. at 681.
8. Id.
9. A somewhat shaky pillar, as Professor Friedmann points out. See
Friedmann, supra note 1, at 865-67.
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Organizing restitution under the general principle of unjust
enrichment found favor in section one of the first Restatement of
Restitution in 1937. Section one reads simply, "A person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other."' 0 Section one is the other pillar of broad
restitution.' 1
Important scholars agree. For example, "[u]njust enrichment,"
the late Professor George Palmer wrote, setting the tone for broad
restitution, "is an indefinable idea in the same way that justice is
indefinable. But many of the meanings of justice are derived from a
sense of injustice,"-here, specifically unjust enrichment. 12 "This
wide and imprecise idea has played a creative role in the
development of an important branch of modem law," he
maintained. 13  Although his four-volume treatise on restitution
bristles with technical rules, Palmer recognized unjust enrichment
standing alone as a safety valve: "The idea of unjust enrichment
permeates almost the whole of restitution and occasionally is called
upon to explain the relief given when anything more precise defies
formulation.
'" 14
Professor Dan Dobbs's views resemble Palmer's. "Unjust
enrichment," Dobbs observed, "cannot be precisely defined, and for
that very reason has the potential for resolving new problems in
striking ways."'15 Dobbs also discussed whether unjust enrichment
standing alone is too imprecise to be a "rule": Vagueness is not the
problem, he insisted, rather the issue of unjustness in difficult
freestanding restitution disputes is "how to treat new forms of
10. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
11. The Restatement limited a plaintiffs restitution for an unsolicited
benefit in section two with the officiousness or "volunteer" concept: "A
person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to
restitution therefor." Id. § 2. Courts that have used section one as a foundation
for broad restitution generally do not cite section two. See, e.g., Kistler v.
Stoddard, 688 S.W.2d 746 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing Restatement
section one); Kossian v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 651, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (discussing the underlying principles of
Restatement section one).
12. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 5 (1978).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 1.7, at 44.
15. DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION § 4.1(2), at 557 (2d ed. 1993).
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intangible value."'16 A court will encounter the difficult task of
adopting restitution doctrine to "substantive issues about what forms
of intangible advantage deserve legal protection."
1 7
The authors of a leading English treatise on restitution also
argue for a generalized right to restitution.18 Respectable scholarly
authority supports unjust enrichment standing alone as an
overarching principle for broad restitution.19
Several courts in the United States, including the court in the
Louisiana decision I used for Contrak's claim against Zale,2' have
based restitution on "natural justice," "equity," and "unjust
enrichment" as expressed by Lord Mansfield and in the Restatement
of the Law of Restitution section one. 21  This Article classifies
decisions of these courts together as broad restitution decisions.
B. Narrow Restitution
Another formidable line of authority, favoring narrow
restitution, rejects restitution based on unjust enrichment alone.
The late Professor John Dawson was an articulate and
redoubtable opponent of restitution based on unjust enrichment
standing alone. His view was that restitution, even though it is based
on sound principles and policies, is susceptible to abuse and requires
principles of confinement. In his view, restitution was inevitable:
[A]ny highly developed legal system needs restitution
remedies and cannot get on without them. No matter how
much attention is devoted to refining and elaborating other
legal techniques, there will remain situations in great
variety for which standard techniques do not provide. The
only common feature in these situations, apart from their
16. Id. at 562.
17. Id. at 563.
18. See LORD GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 12
(Gareth Jones ed., 5th ed. 1998).
19. See generally DOBBS, supra note 15; GOFF & JONES, supra note 18;
PALMER, supra note 12.
20. Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan, 472 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
21. See, e.g., Kistler, 688 S.W.2d 746 (discussing Restatement section one);
Kossian, 254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 62 Cal. Rptr. (discussing the underlying
principles of Restatement section one); Black v. City of Lawrence, 215 P. 297,
299 (Kan. 1923) (quoting Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan); Seastrand v.
D.A. Foley & Co., 175 N.W. 117, 119 (Minn. 1919) (same).
WHEN IS ENRICHMENT UNJUST?
unforeseeability, is the acquisition by one person of a gain
through another's loss.
22
Dawson maintained that restitution based on the defendant's
unjust enrichment alone results when a court transmogrifies an
aspiration into a rule of law.23 He expressed the risk of a court
abusing unjust enrichment standing alone with two metaphors. One
is what I call Dawson's dock:
[A] general principle prohibiting enrichment through
another's loss appears first as a convenient explanation of
specific results; it is an instrument for quite practical and
intelligible purposes. Yet once the idea has been
formulated as a generalization, it has the peculiar faculty of
inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock.24
Dawson's second metaphor was of becoming lost: "Any really
generalized technique, explicitly tied to the unjust enrichment
principle, can carry us so far that we would quickly lose our way."25
Dawson thought that unjust enrichment standing alone enabled a
court to become a dangerous roving commission; wandering, perhaps
intoxicated by the heady brew of its rhetoric, off the end of the dock
or into the labyrinth, in either event, to no good purpose.2 6 He
wielded his rhetoric and metaphor against the two pillars of broad
restitution identified above: Lord Mansfield and the Restatement's
section one:
When lawyers reach the stage of dealing with these [various
unjust enrichment] situations, results can be made
intelligible only through expressing this common feature in
the form of a kind of "rule."
... [Our] ethical faculty, including a sense of justice...
ensures that the disapproval of enrichment through
22. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 150-51 (1951).
23. See id. at 4-5, 8.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 143. Professor Emily Sherwin responded to an earlier draft of this
Article with a slightly different reading of Dawson, to wit: "Dawson's fear
that a decisionmaker's discretion may lead to error led him to be concerned
that a decisionmaker seeking a rule will treat 'unjust enrichment' as a broad
rule which would then eclipse more subtle doctrine." Note from Emily
Sherwin, Professor of Law, University of San Diego (on file with author)
[hereinafter Sherwin, Note].
26. See DAWSON, supra note 22, at 151-52.
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another's loss, once formulated as a motive in particular
cases, will tend to become an imperative. A useful and
necessary principle becomes something more than a
"general guide." In some of its aspects it is a rule. It seems
so simple and so clearly just. Why should we not extend it?
... Our own compilers [of the first Restatement of
Restitution], Professors Seavey and Scott, could scarcely
have had the intention of leading us into the wilderness.
Yet an American court today need only cite Section 1 of the
Restatement of Restitution, if Lord Mansfield seems out of
date.
We have done much and can do more to fortify ourselves.
If we know the forest is enchanted we have not too much to
fear.27
Restitution, Dawson insisted, needed principles of containment
expressed in the form of rules to keep judges from jumping off his
metaphorical dock or from becoming lost in his metaphorical
forest.28 Dawson argued that a court should require the plaintiff to
show "some specific ground" for restitution, like "fraud, mistake,
compulsion, undue influence, impossibility or frustration, sometimes
substantial breach, and certain kinds of illegality." 29 He found other
examples of successful principles of confinement in European
systems of restitution, particularly in German law.3" Contrak's
morally appealing restitution claim against Zale 31 cannot surmount
Dawson's prerequisite "specific ground"; it would fail as a legal
claim.
Dawson's is a slippery-slope argument. 32 Commonly accepted
principles of morality tell us that the defendant's benefit is improper,
and to neutralize the benefit, he should pay restitution to the plaintiff.
A court, Dawson thought, must resist such temptation.33 Instead, the
court ought to draw a definite line between recovery and no
recovery. A court that accepts unjust enrichment standing alone as a
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 117-18.
30. See id. at 119-27, 130-35, 143.
31. See Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan, 472 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App.
1985).
32. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985).
33. See DAWSON, supra note 22, at 143.
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rule or a direction of decision in a particular dispute is drawing a
dangerously indefinite line. For if the court cites unjust enrichment
standing alone to reverse a particular defendant's unfair benefit, it
will create a precedent. In future disputes where the defendants
should win, the courts will be unable to distinguish today's
precedent; the future courts will be constrained to let the plaintiffs
recover. Thus in future disputes, courts attempting to administer this
indefinite line between liability and no liability will make too many
incorrect decisions.
Because of the future error cost it will create with an imprecise
line, a court faced with the first dispute ought to resist the temptation
to base restitution on the defendant's unjust enrichment standing
alone. The court should not establish a precedent that will lead to
incorrect results in future disputes because future judges cannot
distinguish the precedent. The court should countenance an unfair
result today in this dispute to prevent many incorrect results in future
disputes. Because preventing the unwise future decision is more
important than deciding today's dispute correctly, today's plaintiff
must lose. It is far better to give courts a clear, easy-to-administer
rule that leaves some apparent injustice uncorrected rather than an
imprecise rule that sends them off the end of the dock, or leaves them
wandering in the forest-arbitrarily wreaking havoc in the social and
legal systems. The courts must preserve the bright line, for once they
cross it, once they create exceptions, then there is no place to stop.
"The Principle of the Dangerous Precedent," wrote Professor
Cornford, "is that you should not do an admittedly right action for
fear you, or your equally timid successors, should not have the
courage to do right in some future case, which, ex hypothesi, is
essentially different, but superficially resembles the present one."
34
Broad support can be stated in several ways for Dawson's
skepticism about what I have called broad restitution. The
Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment ("Restatement (Third)"), although subject to
revision and not yet official American Law Institute policy, reproves
unjust enrichment as "at best, a name for a legal conclusion that
remains to be explained; at worst, an open-ended and potentially
34. FRANCiS M. CORNFORD, MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA: BEING A
GUIDE FOR THE YOUNG ACADEMIC POLITICIAN 15 (6th ed. 1964) (1908).
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unprincipled charter of liability. '35  The draft suggests that
"unjustified enrichment" moves the court's analysis from moral to
legal to require "enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis."
36
Professor Andrew Burrows, the author of another leading
English work on restitution, prefers not to "leave the question of
what constitutes an unjust enrichment to a judge's unfettered
discretion., 37 Burrows seeks instead to constrain the court with a
definition of unjustness which refers to "the decided cases," and not
to "a vague appeal to individual morality."
38
Precisely when a defendant's unjust enrichment compels a court
to grant a plaintiff restitution is not evident to proponents of narrow
restitution. They think that the phrase, too abstract to have a
generally accepted meaning, is both incomplete and inadequate. The
words "unjust enrichment" are an incomplete statement of a rule
because a court's analysis moves from abstract principle to concrete
result without an intermediate rule structure. "Unjust enrichment" is
an inadequate rule because it provides little or no guidance for
people forming contracts and planning primary conduct, for lawyers
drafting documents and negotiating settlements, and for judges
drafting jury instructions and deciding motions or appeals. A major
risk proponents of narrow restitution perceive is that a decisionmaker
will fill the doctrinal vacuum with individual morality.
Finally, the phrase "unjust enrichment" at large creates an
unbounded and unpredictable source of potential liability. The
concept of unjust enrichment may not lead courts to "creative"
decisions, as Palmer maintained;39 however, because it is an open-
ended and indeterminate concept, narrow restitution's advocates
argue that it may be a foundation for unpredictable decisions in the
future.
On the one hand, broad restitution provides courts with a wide
charter to correct unjust enrichment. On the other hand, two related
ideas are central to the criticism of broad restitution. Unjust
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § I
cmt. b (Discussion Draft 2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. As an
advisor to the Restatement (Third), I will state the obvious: Nothing in this
Article is ALI policy or Restatement doctrine.
36. Id.
37. ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 55 (1993).
38. Id.
39. See PALMER, supra note 12, at 5.
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enrichment standing alone is too vague for a decisionmaker to
understand and apply. Moreover, it creates too much judicial
discretion. As such, it leads to unpredictable court decisions and to
potentially excessive recovery for plaintiffs. Narrow restitution
formulations facilitate stability and predictability and curb subjective
judicial decisions.
There is a danger, however, that many of the critics of broad
restitution would purchase legal stability at the potentially high cost
of depriving courts of flexibility to develop the common law to
changing conditions and to adopt appropriate solutions for disparate
disputes. This Article will propose a modified form of broad
restitution, a middle ground between the broad and narrow poles.
IV. RESTITUTION ANALYSIS AND COMMON LAW TECHNIQUE
A. Restitution Analysis in General
Unlike courts in most other countries, judges in the United
States administer restitution with a lay jury.40 Also, restitution in the
United States is judge-made: the courts use common law techniques
to decide unprovided-for disputes and shape restitution doctrines to
contemporary needs, through powers that include the ability to
repudiate obsolete or inappropriate doctrines.41 Each jurisdiction in
the United States has the final say on restitution doctrine within its
bailiwick. Contrast that, for example, with the United Kingdom
where the House of Lords has both the power and the ability to
create a unified and well-articulated body of common law.
How to travel from a principle to a rule to a decision in a dispute
is more of an analytical technique or process than a set of rules. The
40. In contrast to the civil courts in the rest of the world that lack juries,
several leading United States restitution decisions are appeals from jury
verdicts. See, e.g., Campbell v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 421 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.
1969); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946); Raven Red
Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946); Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W.
164 (Ark. 1907); Maglica v. Maglica, 66 Cal. App. 4th 442, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d
101 (1998).
41. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES:
MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 68-73, 140-42, 151-56
(2001) (maintaining that courts should follow "a standard that allows judges to
overrule, but presumptively favors retention of the rule"); RONALD A. CASS,
THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA ch. 5 (2001).
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law often boils down to a series of questions that focus the
decisionmakers' critical judgments on the important features of the
dispute. Enrichment and unjustness are spongy ideas. Restitution
doctrines have never comprised precise rules that lead to predictable
and certain results.
No one has identified a substitute for applying human judgment
to discrete instances. Explanations that seek to decide controversies
based on a single factor fail to provide the assembly-line justice they
promise.
This Article recommends that courts use a modified form of
broad restitution based on applying common law technique and
examining related bodies of law to resolve restitution disputes. It
first proposes a legal-realist approach and a common law technique.
Some bodies of knowledge are better conveyed by answers. Other
bodies of knowledge are better conveyed as avenues of inquiry; they
are better analyzed through a series of questions. The kind of
restitution this Article discusses is one of the latter. Paraphrasing
Leon Green on negligence, we may have a process for passing
judgment on this kind of restitution dispute, but there is practically
no "law of restitution" beyond the process itself.
42
A series of questions will focus judges' and jurors' critical
judgments on the crucial restitution issues. While the answers to
those questions will not steer everyone to the same solution of a
difficult restitution dispute, they should focus everyone's judgment
on the important issues and lead to a beneficial discussion, if not to
universal approbation for a particular solution. Because of the
untidiness that results, observers of restitution will need to tolerate
process, ambiguity, pluralism, and even some inconsistency.
The first three questions are standard: Has the defendant
benefited or been enriched? Was the defendant's enrichment unjust?
Was the defendant's benefit, if any, at the plaintiffs expense? 43
This Article recommends that a judge or a jury ought to
emphasize the question: Will granting the plaintiff restitution
42. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 185 (1930).
43. The reader will observe the influence of English scholars in formulating
the foregoing questions. See GOFF & JONES, supra note 18, at 15; Peter Birks,
At the Expense of the Claimant: Direct and Indirect Enrichment in English
Law, OXFORD U. COMP. L. F. 3, 16 n. 11 (2000), available at
http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/birks.htm.
1002
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undermine a policy of property, contract, tort or other substantive
law?
44
A court should not award a plaintiff restitution without
examining restitution's effect on other substantive doctrines that
decline liability. Counter-policies that militate against granting
restitution may emerge from examining the property, contract, tort,
or other substantive doctrines that forbid or do not support
compensatory damages. If the plaintiff cannot recover under a
related non-restitution substantive principle, can the judge grant and
measure restitution in ways that advance, or at least do not retard, the
non-restitution principle? In short, can the court grant and measure
restitution yet avoid incongruence with the related substantive
policy?
A court can solve most difficult disputes asking for broad
restitution by applying common law technique and by asking
whether a decision to grant restitution will undermine the reason the
plaintiff cannot recover under another body of substantive law.
These inquiries will lead the court to decisions that serve the goal of
restitution in a way that responds to the valid concerns which lead to
narrow restitution.
Contrak's troublesome related substantive doctrine is contract.
45
He had a contract with Beyer. By remodeling now to be paid later,
he extended credit to Beyer. All extensions of credit include the risk
of nonpayment. Should Contrak suffer the consequence of extending
unsecured credit to tomorrow's bankrupt? The other side of the
dispute emphasizes Zale's enrichment-the remodeled bathrooms-
and maintains that Zale's benefit is unjust and should not be free.
44. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67
TEX. L. REv. 1277, 1284-85 (1989); Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity:
An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2083, 2112
(2001) (concluding that the decisions she analyzed "moved far afield of
established doctrine and, if regularized, would entail significant changes in the
rules governing contracts, insurance, and gifts."). Aware of the analytical
difference between this article and hers, Professor Sherwin nevertheless
expressed her opinion that Professor Dawson would agree with the point in the
text above because of his concern that broad restitution would "eclipse more
subtle doctrine." See Sherwin, Note, supra note 25.
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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B. Common Law Technique
One feature of narrow restitution arguments, particularly in the
Restatement (Third) and Professor Burrows's book, is the distinction
between established legal precedents and a decisionmaker's personal
moral justifications for restitution.46  These authorities register
approbation for granting restitution based on established legal
precedent, but they disapprove of individual moral judgments.47
The jury and the common law court's choice, I will argue, is
more complex than the foregoing. As my above quotation from
Professor Cornford4 8 foreshadows, I trust a future court's ability to
decide a similar dispute correctly enough to dispense with petrified
adherence to earlier solutions. Asking "what did we do last time?"
and accepting the answer without more is too static. Wiser by far is
the court that asks in addition, "Did it make sense then?" and "Does
it make sense today?
4 9
One part of common law technique is the doctrine of
precedent-treating like disputes alike while adapting to changing
conditions and aspirations over time.5 0 The doctrine of precedent
includes rules dealing with how a decisionmaker may mold the
results from earlier disputes to decide later disputes and rules about
when a prudent decisionmaker may abandon earlier decisions.
The common law process requires judges, often working with
juries, to create solutions to disputes. These solutions govern the
past events of the present dispute and simultaneously become rules
of precedent for unknown future disputes. The process of creating,
applying, and promulgating decisions means that courts modify the
common law in the course of deciding disputes.
The court that looks backward to earlier judicial precedents and
declines to grant a plaintiff restitution if it finds none will petrify the
common law and may interfere with the court's duty to correct actual
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 35, § 1; BURROWS, supra note
37, at 21.
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 35, § 2(3); BURROWS, supra
note 37, at 21.
48. See CORNFORD, supra note 34.
49. If this is heresy to the Washington and Lee creed, I plead guilty.
50. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 41, at 68-73, 140-42, 151-
56; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 181-
87(1991).
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instances of unjust enrichment. Under the better principles of
common law reasoning, as articulated by Professor Melvin
Eisenberg, a court should not consider legal rules to occupy a
separate moral domain within the whole society's moral universe.
5 1
Requiring support of legal precedent as a prerequisite is too narrow.
A court deciding a difficult restitution dispute should first examine
legal precedents and administrative necessities. It should then look
beyond legal precedents to the whole society's moral and economic
values.
Professor Eisenberg distinguishes doctrinal propositions from
social propositions. 52 Doctrinal propositions are legal rules in the
documents lawyers think of as expressing legal doctrine; social
propositions are expressions of morality, economic policy, and
experience. 53 Common law courts, Eisenberg maintains, may revise
a rule when it is incongruous with its justification.54 The court ought
to compare doctrinal propositions to social propositions seeking what
he calls "double coherence." 55 Does the rule reflect contemporary
values and policies? 56  Is it also logically consistent with other
doctrine? 57  A court's obligation to the common law transcends
judges' personal beliefs.58
Professor Eisenberg insists that the judge ought to eschew
decisions based on personal morality unless the view is also shared
generally. The court should follow widely held social propositions,
not personal ones.59  Thus, social propositions operate in every
decision, if only in the background. 60 Although Eisenberg does not
51. See MELvIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
152-53 (1988); see also Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REv. 739, 751-54 (1982) (showing how moral values enrich
constitutional interpretation).
52. See EISENBERG, supra note 51, at 1-2.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 44-49.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 14-19, 26-37.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 21-26.
59. See id. at 14-42.
60. See id.; see also Fiss, supra note 51, at 754 ("[J]udges have an incentive
to temper their commitment to [positivistic] legal theory and thus to read the
moral as well as the legal text.").
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cite Dawson's work,61 he appears to reject the reasoning that led
Dawson to the dock and forest metaphors.
62
Other constraining factors, in addition to coherence, operate on
courts-the lawyers' adversary arguments and techniques, the
tradition and reality of jury trial, and the need for written
justifications. Important parts of professional training and discourse
leading courts to create and modify common law rules are the
arguments presented by lawyers, accepted by juries, and justified in a
court's written decision stating reasons.
Restitution is a body of common law principles that exists
between and behind property, contract, and tort, and where it
produces variations and analogies. Contested freestanding restitution
disputes, particularly of the section one variety, are unruly. Often
"unique," they do not conform to any pattern. There is no precedent,
and there are strong arguments on both sides. In a world where no
rule exists, the court's decision perforce creates a rule.
In the United States, restitution is common law or judge-made
law. As distinguished from statutes, judges make and apply common
law rules at the same time. Common law courts remake common
law rules in the act of applying them. If the doctrine of precedent
means that a decision is one that affects future disputes that fall
within the ambit of its principle, a skeptic might view a common law
rule as not a rule at all. A wise and prudent court will tailor a
difficult restitution decision to the individual dispute. The court may
be lacking in direct precedent; its decision will not create much
precedent; and the decision may create new law. If no rule is
apparent, the court will develop one; if the rule is outmoded or
unfitting, the court will replace or modify it within the ambit of the
constraining techniques discussed above.
The more formal style articulated by Professor Burrows and in
the Restatement (Third) emphasizes that law is a system of rules that
are known or can be found; a court's decision-making is deductive
reasoning from these rules.63 A court will apply known and precise
61. See DAWSON, supra note 22.
62. See EISENBERG, supra note 51, at 14-42.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 35, § I cmt. b; BURROWS, supra
note 37, at 1-3, 55.
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rules to the facts. It need not look above legal rules to the whole
society's moral code or economic-commercial needs.
64
Society is too complex and changes too rapidly for that
conception of law to describe a court's common law decision-
making. In exceptional cases, replacing legal rules that lack social
support with rules based on existing standards is a significant and
inevitable ingredient in a court's common law technique.
65
V. THREE EXAMPLES
66
Since a court following broad-restitution reasoning can be too
capacious, the question of whether a particular defendant has been
unjustly enriched requires rigorous legal analysis. This Article
commends a tough-minded common law technique that examines
benefit, unjustness and, in particular, the effect restitution would
have on related legal regimes.
When a plaintiff seeks freestanding restitution, the court's
inquiry into whether granting recovery would undermine the policy
reason to reject restitution may be complex and difficult. Legal
systems develop restitution after the basics of contract, property, and
tort are in place. Late arrivals have the difficulty of accommodating
established systems. Often unjust enrichment policies point a
decisionmaker in one direction and the other substantive system's
policies point him in another.67  To properly accommodate
apparently conflicting policies requires the court to pay sedulous
64. The Restatement (Third) and Professor Burrows may be more subtle
than the textual statement, and they may preserve play in the common law's
joints. The discussion draft explains that "unjustified" in unjustified
enrichment is intended neither to repudiate the traditional, equitable
explanation of restitutionary liability nor to suggest any change in the nature or
scope of those rules that have previously been described in terms of unjust
enrichment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 35, § 1 cmt. b. Professor
Burrows would keep the common law courts' "traditional incremental
deductive approach," and the common law's "gradual incremental
development." BURROWS, supra note 37, at 55.
65. See Sherwin, supra note 1, at 2111-12.
66. In this Section, I provide three examples: Brad-On-Tape, the drained
quarries, and the Onyx bathrooms. While I made up the first example, the
other two are derived from two actual cases-Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 15 A. 65
(Me. Super. Ct. 1888); Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan, 472 So. 2d 598 (La.
Ct. App. 1985)--with a slight modification of facts to make them fit the
analysis.
67. See DAWSON, supra note 22, at 38-40.
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attention to facts and context, and to compare incommensurate
values in ways the metaphor of weighing and balancing does not
quite capture.
A. First Example-The Expired Copyright
Long after the copyright on Henry Johns's nineteenth-century
novel Tightening the Bolt expired, Brad-On-Tape recorded a
compact-disc version and rented it profitably to its customers.
Johns's literary executor and heirs sued Brad for restitution. Clearly
benefited by the novel, Brad nevertheless is not liable to the former
copyright proprietors for restitution.
In asking whether Brad's enrichment is unjust, I am aided by
focusing on whether granting restitution to plaintiffs will undermine
the policy reason to deny recovery under the related legal regime,
here copyright. After protecting the author's exclusive right to
"copy" for a limited term to encourage authors to create, the
copyright statutes end his statutory monopoly and recognize non-
ownership in the public domain after the fixed term expires.
Terminating the author's monopoly advances an interest related to
the free expression protected by the First Amendment; the purpose is
to advance the social interest in wide dissemination. Any publisher
is free to copy, print, record, or otherwise peddle the work. The
author's heirs cannot use copyright doctrines to prevent Brad's
taping and dissemination after that term. Accordingly, the court
should not grant them restitution, which would upset the way
copyright law allocates between protection and dissemination. Brad-
On-Tape's enrichment is not unjust.
68
68. There are other ways to express this conclusion. The Constitution
delegates to Congress "Power" to grant to "Authors" the copyright monopoly
for only "limited Times." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also Eldred v. Ashcroft,
__ U.S. __ 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). Professor Nimmer thought the proprietor's
property interest in copyrighted material was for a fixed period instead of
being perpetual like real or personal property because of the public interest in
free speech under the First Amendment. See Melville B. Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1193-96 (1970). Among other techniques
Congress used to circumscribe an author's copyright monopoly, the Copyright
Act abolishes or preempts state doctrines equivalent to copyright. See 17
U.S.C. § 301 (1976). Although I found no decision directly on point, granting
the plaintiffs in the text restitution would give them a copyright-like protection
in something within the subject matter of copyright, but not covered by
1008
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No responsible author of an article about restitution would pass
up an opportunity to quote Lord Mansfield who warned in 1785:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have
employed their time for the service of the community, may
not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their
ingenuity, and labour; the other, that the world may not be
deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be
retarded.69
The copyright statutes strike the balance between Lord Mansfield's
"extremes"- restitution should respect it.
B. Second Example-The Drained Quarry
70
Restitution for the plaintiff's improvement of the defendant's
property-the subject of this example and the next one-raises
efficiency problems, liquidity problems, valuation problems, and
efficiency-autonomy problems. Although the defendant's benefit
may be clear, the court should analyze carefully what effect granting
restitution would have on related contract and property law.
Ron and Quince own adjoining tracts of rural land; both tracts
have stone quarries which are connected by tunnels underground.
Because of depressed prices for the stone and the mines'
obsolescence, the quarries have not been worked for decades and
have filled with rain water. After a building boom triggered a
dramatic price rise, quarrying stone became economically feasible.
Ron approached Quince with a plan to share the cost of pumping the
water out of both quarries, but Quince refused to agree. So Ron
pumped the water out of his quarry which, because of the connecting
copyright. To advance the constitutional policy of "allowing free access to
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain," Justice Black wrote for a unanimous Court, "when an article is
unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy
that article." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237
(1964). In short, granting restitution to Johns's heirs would grant what
copyright law forbids. Restitution would be a preempted state law doctrine,
because it prevents or burdens a competitor from making copies. Restitution
would effectively extend copyright protection when the copyright law would
not extend it because of expiration of statutory copyright.
69. Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B. 1785).
70. This example is based on the facts and decision in Ulmer v.
Farnsworth, 15 A. 65 (Me. Sup. Ct. 1888).
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tunnels, also drained the water from Quince's. Quince sold her
quarry to Sam who paid her several tens of thousands dollars more
than he would have if her quarry had still been flooded. Quince,
clearly benefited, laughs all the way to the bank because she does not
have to pay Ron restitution.
Why not? Consider related contract and property doctrine.
After Ron and Quince negotiated but did not form a contract, Ron
went ahead. Ron intentionally conferred the benefit on Quince's
property that she had declined to form a contract to pay for. Property
ownership includes an owner's autonomy to decide whether to
improve it; an owner's improvements ought to come from her own
efforts and her contracts with others. Particularly after an owner has
declined to form a contract, a court should not interfere with the
owner's right to choose.
Freedom to contract includes freedom from contract. Quince is
not liable to Ron in contract because she specifically declined to
enter into one. The court's decision on restitution ought to be made
in light of the reasons to favor voluntary exchange, to preserve
autonomy about whom to deal with and how to spend money, to set
the value both sides place on the exchange, and to facilitate efficient
exchanges which leave both people better off.
Moreover, since Ron went ahead after Quince declined to
participate in his pumping scheme, a court should assume he
calculated a gain from the benefits to his quarry alone less his costs
to pump out both quarries. He is not entitled to confer this benefit on
her and then ask the court to order her to pay.
Declining restitution here creates what an economist may call
holdout, bilateral monopoly, and free rider problems. In practical
terms, Quince may have tried to negotiate an extremely favorable
price and then, failing agreement but knowing Ron would be likely
to proceed, she received the benefit of Ron's efforts. Denying Ron
restitution puts a premium on her uncooperative behavior. Declining
Ron restitution nevertheless is but another way of saying that an
owner's autonomy and freedom of choice include the freedom to be
stubborn, even pigheaded, within the ambit of the law and to resist
another's entreaty.
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The parties' contract will control if there is one. The parties'
failure to contract should control if Quince declined to form one.
71
C. Third Example-Restitution Revisits the Onyx Bathrooms
72
Cal Contrak was hired by Bertha Beyer to remodel two
bathrooms in Chateau Haut LaRue, an antebellum plantation house
Beyer was purchasing for $860,000 from Tom Zale. After Contrak
finished installing onyx tile, Beyer paid him with a $41,000 check
which Beyer's bank returned to Contrak dishonored--"not sufficient
funds." Before the scheduled closing, Beyer defaulted on her
contract with Zale. Beyer is now in a federal penitentiary after
pleading guilty to unrelated fraud charges. Contrak sued Beyer and
Zale for $41,000; Beyer for breach of contract and Zale for
restitution-unjust enrichment. After Beyer defaulted, she filed for
bankruptcy and discharged Contrak's $41,000 judgment for breach
of contract.
Contrak maintains that since the original bathrooms were
installed in the 1920s, Zale was enriched or
benefited by the remodeled bathrooms. Zale, who
has moved back into Chateau Haut LaRue and
does not intend to redo the bathrooms,
nevertheless cites aesthetic misgivings. In
particular, he thinks the flashy and gaudy onyx
bathroom furnishings are incompatible with both
his sedate lifestyle and with the chateau's
antebellum decor.
73
The onyx bathrooms will repay careful study and lead to heated
discussion. Zale's argument against restitution follows. Almost all
property improvements occur after a contract in which the owner and
the improver agree on the project and the price. The bargained
71. Professor Friedmann analyzed the decision that this example is based
on, and concluded that with the facts presented in the text, the court ought to
grant Ron restitution. See Friedmann, supra note 1, at 849-52. Our
contrasting conclusions illustrate the pluralism this Article recognizes: when
dealing with disputed freestanding restitution disputes, people may follow the
same or similar analysis to dissimilar results.
72. This example is based on the facts and decision in Orleans Onyx, Inc. v.
Buchanan, 472 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
73. Steve Alaniz & Francesco Marciuliano, Sally Forth, THE WASH. POST,
May 21, 2002, at C13.
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contractual exchange has two economic advantages. First, economic
theory tells us that because each party values the other's
consideration more than his or her own, both parties to a voluntary
transaction are better off after the exchange. Second, the parties'
price term sets a value. Here the home-buyer was willing to pay
plaintiff Contrak $41,000 in a bargained exchange for an
improvement, but defendant Zale was not involved in the transaction.
Contrak has conferred a benefit on Zale and then Contrak has
sued Zale for its value. If the court both legally validates the benefit
Contrak conferred on Zale and then sets its value, two consequences
will be likely: First, the court will interfere with Zale's autonomy to
decide how to spend his money and how to keep his property; and
second, the court will value the improvement inefficiently, or less
efficiently than a negotiated exchange would have. People should
organize improvements and transfers under voluntary contracts
whenever that is reasonably possible. And Contrak did have a
contract with Beyer. Thus, the court should reject Contrak's request
for restitution from Zale and remit Contrak to the typical unpaid fate
of someone who extended unsecured credit to a future bankrupt.
In the decision that this problem is based on, the trial judge and
the appellate court thought not.74 The defaulting buyer had paid the
contractor about half of the contract rate, and the trial judge had
entered a judgment for restitution against the homeowner for about
another fourth, leaving the contractor paid about three-fourths of the
contract rate. 75 The homeowner who had lost the sale was, however,
"enriched" by the gaudy and incongruous bathrooms, which no one
expected would be torn out. 76 The homeowner's enrichment was
obviously, though indirectly, at the cost of the hapless contractor.
77
Furthermore, it would be "unjust" to let the homeowner keep the
remodeled bathrooms without paying anyone anything. Although
the trial judge may have made an uneducated guess on how to
measure his restitution, the jilted contractor recovered an amount,
which was probably less than profitable for its efforts.78 After all,
restitution is based on the defendant's benefit, not the plaintiff s loss.
74. See Orleans Onyx, 472 So. 2d at 600.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 601.
77. See id. at 600.
78. See id.
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The "right" answer then, the answer under precedent, to the
onyx bathrooms is for Contrak to receive a restitution judgment
against Zale for as much as $30,000. One difference between this
example and Quince's quarries above is that Quince had converted
her benefit to cash by selling it, while Zale is living with his. If Zale
lacks the resources to pay the judgment for remodeling he did not
order, Contrak can file it for a judgment lien on Chateau Haut
LaRue, creating the equivalent of a mechanic's lien which was not
available to him otherwise. 79 Many readers will disagree with the
courts about the onyx bathrooms.
If the courts had applied the original Restatement of the Law of
Restitution's section 110, Contrak would not have recovered
anything. According to that section's blackletter, "A person
[Contrak] who has conferred a benefit upon another [Zale] as the
performance of a contract with a third person [Beyer] is not entitled
to restitution from the other [Zale] merely because of the failure of
performance by the third person [Beyer].08  The Restatement
commentary does not supply intelligible reasons for this flat rule.
There are justifications for refusing Contrak restitution. A court
could limit Contrak to his contract rights against Beyer because
Contrak extended credit to Beyer by remodeling the bathrooms
without being paid. Moreover, if Contrak recovers from a second-
best defendant, Zale, after Beyer's bankruptcy, the effect of Beyer's
bankruptcy discharge and distribution may be distorted. In short,
Contrak picked the wrong person to work for without assuring
payment and ought to suffer the consequences of Beyer's bankruptcy
discharge.
81
Under the head of "enrichment," the onyx bathrooms illustrate
problems of value and liquidity. The principal issue under
79. A less intrusive solution would be to grant Contrak restitution in the
form of an equitable lien that Contrak could file for record notice, but which he
could not realize on until Zale solves the liquidity problem by selling the
property.
80. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 110 (1937). The
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 29 (Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 2002) expands the "merely because" in Restatement of the Law of
Restitution § 110, and presents a variety of more flexible solutions than § 110.
Not yet considered by either the Council or the membership, § 29 of
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment is not an American
Law Institute policy.
81. See Birks, supra note 43, at 1.
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"unjustness" is whether a court may reject restitution and limit
Contrak's recovery to his contract with Beyer. Instead of
Restatement of the Law of Restitution section 1 10's obstruction, this
article proposes to the court the following factual and contextual
question: Would granting Contrak restitution from Zale seriously
erode the reasons Contrak cannot recover from Beyer in contract?
Although a restitution scholar could wish for better analysis
from the court on this point, if a court were to grant Contrak
restitution, it could give several intellectually respectable reasons.
Although Contrak and Zale did not have a contract to remodel the
bathrooms, Contrak did not intend to make a gift to Zale, for
Contrak's contract with Beyer negates any intent to confer a gift on
anyone. Contrak expected payment-from someone. Zale received
a benefit, of sorts, a benefit which Zale retains, perhaps because it
can be neither returned nor reversed without tearing the onyx
bathrooms out. Perhaps Zale is better off with the "improved"
bathrooms both in personal comfort and in augmented market value.
The court can measure Contrak's restitution conservatively so that
the episode leaves Contrak without "profit" and retains the sting of
dealing with Beyer. Perhaps Contrak will recover restitution
measured by Zale's gain in market value. Value after less value
before equals Zale's "benefit."
82
On the other hand, a court can give persuasive reasons to deny
Contrak restitution. Although Zale has paid no one, forcing him to
pay Contrak lets Contrak confer a benefit, albeit under contract with
another, and force Zale, a non-party to the contract, to pay. Zale
contracted with no one; forcing Zale to pay Contrak restitution is an
inefficient judicial transaction. Restitution interferes with Zale's
autonomy and ability to form contracts for home improvement, or to
spend that money for anything else. Zale's benefit is both illiquid,
no pun intended, and difficult to value; the shock to Zale's spirit
from the onyx's adverse aesthetics may overcome any augmented,
but unrealized, market value. Zale can neither return the remodeled
bathrooms nor even remove them without leaving him with no
bathrooms at all.
82. See Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor, supra note 2,
at 2076-78.
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On balance, the considerations against restitution in the
preceding paragraph persuade me more than the considerations
supporting it above. But a court, which followed the common law
analysis I have suggested into how restitution affects related
doctrines and granted Contrak recovery, would not have jumped off
the end of Professor Dawson's dock or become lost in his wilderness.
In other words, a court's dissimilar result on the "unjustness" fault-
line is part of the pluralism we should expect and tolerate in
perplexing restitution disputes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In contrast to restitution for breach where the non-restitution
substantive doctrine the defendant violated supplies the court with
objective standards of unjustness, freestanding restitution disputes
create a risk of a decision that diverges from established
expectations. Courts and scholars have struggled with the problem
of how to render just, yet predictable and consistent, freestanding-
restitution decisions.
Following the factual and contextual analysis I present above,
lawyers, jurors, and judges will ask a series of questions in the aegis
of the common law technique. These questions will use related
substantive doctrine, as well as moral and economic considerations,
to focus their judgment on the hard question of unjustness. Preparing
to accept responsibility for the decisions by formulating reasoned
justifications for their ultimate choice will focus courts' judgment on
the crucial issues in determining unjustness. Guided and constrained
by past decisions, but not frozen to them, they will occasionally
disagree about how to accommodate the sometimes-competing
values of restitution and non-restitution substantive doctrines.
Winter 2003] 1015
1016 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 36:991
